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1 Introduction
Why should we care about future generations? Why should the generations care about each other?
The answer to both questions lies in the fact that the generations are interconnected by nature.
Biologically speaking there are two periods in our life cycle when we find ourselves in a state of
dependence. Infants and young children are unproductive and become fully productive only as they
mature physically and intellectually (UN, 2013). Likewise, with ageing the ability to produce is
affected dramatically. It is these biological forces that produce the inverted U-shaped pattern that
characterizes labor productivity and which generate the economic life cycle illustrated in Figure 1.
As Figure 1 demonstrates the life-cycle pattern of consumption and income leads to a mismatch
between needs and means. On the one hand, age groups like the young and elderly consume more
than they produce while, on the other, working-age cohorts consume less than they produce. As
such, there is a need for a mechanism to reallocate economic resources between age groups, that is,
market or private and/or public intergenerational transfers, henceforth, IGTs.1 In this paper, we
opt to focus solely on public IGTs.
The literature on public IGTs is large but fragmented. It dates back to initial studies that sought
to determine the golden rule of capital accumulation in the standard overlapping-generations (OLG)
framework (Diamond, 1965). In this setting, abstracting from altruism and the consideration of
young dependents, the failure of the competitive economy to meet the golden rule creates a key role
for public IGTs financed via capitalization (pay-as-you-go) when there is under (over) accumulation.
After various decades, probably as a result of the demographic transition, this literature struck
out again but in a number of different directions. Some authors highlight the fact that besides
the elderly, children are also dependent.2 Thus, in accounting for the dependence of both age
groups, the need for government intervention might derive from the fact that the markets and intra-
family reallocations are failing to achieve certain important social goals by providing non-optimal
investments in human capital for the young and pensions for the old (Becker and Murphy, 1988). But,
if the government only finances public pensions and public education, this may not be sufficient to
achieve economic efficiency (Boldrin and Montes, 2005). One way of solving this problem is to create
a link between public education and pensions, providing generations with appropriate incentives to
reallocate public funds. A social contract of this type - where public pensions are properly linked to
earlier investments in education – allows a complete market allocation to be obtained (Boldrin and
Montes, 2009).
Thus, the connection between the transfer to children and the transfer to the elderly (already
present in the family) has emerged also in the public sphere. Various scholars have argued in fa-
vor of the link between forward and backward public IGTs as they seek to answer the question
as to why selfish generations might choose to transfer resources to future generations. Pogue and
Sgontz (1977) argue that the design of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system creates the ap-
1Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the IGTs and the life cycle deficit for all the countries in our sample. It highlights
the different patterns of public and private transfers in countries with different economic structures and different levels
of economic development.
2Peters (1995) and Boldrin and Montes (2005) investigate a similar policy when parents take decisions regarding
their children’s human capital, while Bental (1989) and Abio et al. (2004) consider fertility to be endogenous.
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Figure 1: Average patterns of consumption, labor income and life-cycle deficit for 18 NTA countries. The young and
elderly obviously consume more than they produce, a fact that is highlighted by the line taken by the life-cycle deficit
(consumption minus labor income). The opposite scenario is presented by the working-age cohorts. All the values are
calculated converting currencies to US dollars (per capita) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) ratios in a particular
year for each country.
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propriate incentives to invest in public education, because it enhances the income of the future
working generation. In a similar vein, Konrad (1995) claims that, even in the absence of altruism,
the working-class generations are only willing to pay for public education if they can “reap” gains
by taxing the results of higher productivity in the future. Another incentive for the working-age
generation to transfer economic resources towards the young one could be the higher returns on
savings [Boldrin (1992); Boldrin and Rustichini (2000)]. More specifically, the decision to invest in
education reflects positively on physical capital productivity because of its complementarity with
human capital productivity. This in turn enhances the future return on savings and therefore offers
higher future income to the current working age generation.
Kemnitz (2000) considers the link between pensions and education in an OLG setting using the
public choice framework, where policy is forged by the relative political power of generations. The
level of IGTs is decided by the majority of voters in a context of representative democracy, where
governments seek to maximize political support. The main result stemming from this study is that
the structure of the PAYG pension system stimulates investments in education that provide future
benefits for the current working generation. According to this study, the structure of the PAYG
pension system provides incentives to the working-age generation to support educational transfers
towards the young even in the absence of altruism. Moreover, the author shows that population
ageing achieves a better backward (pensions) and forward (education) redistribution of public funds.
From the perspective afforded by the political economy, a critical aspect of an IGT system is its
political sustainability and the actuarial fairness between contributions paid and benefits received.3
3Regarding the actuarial fairness, Bommier et al. (2010) calculate present values of generations before the intro-
duction of public intergenerational transfers and for a long period after. They try to assess whether the generations
have been benefited from the public transfers or not. The results suggest that most generations born after 1930 have
been better off from the introduction of social security and public education.
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In this regard, Rangel (2003) employing a game theoretical framework of intergenerational exchange,
examines the possibility of sustaining a system of public forward and backward intergenerational
transfers (hereafter, FITs and BITs, respectively). He uses the concept of a sub-game perfect
equilibrium in order to investigate, in the context of selfish generations, the ability of non-market
intergenerational arrangements to invest optimally in forward and backward transfers. According
to Rangel, for this to happen three conditions must be satisfied: First, the agents should have at
least two exchange problems that require simultaneous cooperation; second, the intergenerational
program must generate a positive continuation surplus in order to be supported by the middle-aged
generation; and, third, the generations must play a game of simple trigger strategies that creates
the link between BITs and FITs. The fear of punishment provides incentives to the middle-aged
generation to choose the right amount to invest in BITs and FITs.
We conduct an empirical exercise that exploits the novel data approach of the National Transfer
Accounts (henceforth, NTA) and the political economy framework of Rangel’s (2003) application.
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical work has yet to assess in this way whether a joint system
of public pensions and education or a system of total public IGTs – directed towards the elderly and
young – can be politically sustained. This is what we attempt here, and is what can be considered
as the value added to the existing literature. Our main findings suggest that a system of total public
transfers towards the elderly and young would receive significantly more political support than a
joint system of pensions and education. This outcome is probably driven by the fact that total
public transfers appeal more to a broader group of voters than is the case of a system of pensions
and education. In addition, we find that population ageing has a positive effect on the political
viability of both systems of IGTs.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the methodology.
In section 3 we provide the results of our empirical exercise on pensions and education as well as
on total public IGTS. The last section contains concluding remarks and some insights on what we
learn from this exercise, the potential policy implications and future lines of research.
2 Data & Methodology
2.1 National Transfer Accounts (NTA) Data
Conventional economic accounts do not lend themselves to analyses of the way people behave at
different stages of the economic life cycle. More specifically, such methods usually report annual
flows of public benefits and taxes as a share of GDP. Although this is useful information, it does
not capture the age direction of public transfers and, therefore, fails to provide crucial information
about who pays and who receives. Furthermore, private transfers occurring outside the market
are ignored. By way of alternative, here, we exploit the specific structure of the National Transfer
Accounts (NTA) data, which provide us with a complete, systematic and coherent accounting of
economic flows from one age group to another.4
4The NTA data is taken from Lee and Mason (2011) and http://www.ntaccounts.org/web/nta/show/Country%
20Summaries. The NTA manual presents the concepts, methods and estimation procedures to measure these flows
over the life-cycle (UN, 2013).
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Figure 2: Average life-cycle deficit (LCD), and public (TG) and private transfers (TF) for 18 countries. The higher
the LCD, the greater is the need for IGTs. LCD, TG and TF values are calculated by converting currencies to US dollars
(per capita) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) ratios in a particular year for each country. See detailed country
graphs in the Appendix, Figure 4.
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Starting from the national accounting identity, this method employs public administrative data
and micro data surveys to measure, first, the age reallocations made by the public sector, and,
second, the private transfers within the family. Figure 2 plots the age profile of the life-cycle deficit
(LCD) for eighteen countries and how this is financed via private (TF) and public transfers (TG).
The part of LCD not covered by transfers is funded resorting to the asset market (asset income
and dissaving). These NTA age profiles are consistently upgraded in the National Accounts. The
transfer profiles (TG and TF) are net. In the case of public transfers, the NTA method assigns
an aggregate amount of taxes to each category of public expenditure and we use the age profile of
explicit earmarked taxes, that is, social contributions, in the case of pensions, or general taxes in
all other cases. The balance is set to zero and the eventual surplus/deficit is recorded as public
savings/dissaving.
We employ the NTA estimates that provide us with measures of total public transfer inflows
(benefits) and outflows (taxes and public asset-based flows) by single years of age.5 We use cross-
sectional data for a specific year in each of 18 countries.6 Likewise, when available, we use the same
type of public transfer data disaggregated between pensions and education.7 These data provide us
with the net transfers (net of taxes and/or contributions) received by individuals at each stage of
the life cycle, thus enabling us to gauge their willingness to vote. In this way, we are able to assess
the political sustainability of the IGT system, i.e. of pensions and education. Moreover, we use data
for the current demographic structure of each country as well as for that projected in the future
to compute the size of the voting cohorts. Figure 3 illustrates the demographic transition showing
5Public transfers comprise public education, health, pensions, and other in-kind and in-cash transfers. Each of
these categories includes the inflows and outflows that people receive and pay during each year of their life.
6Austria (2000), Brazil (1996), Costa Rica (2004), Finland (2004), Germany (2003), Hungary (2005), India (2004),
Indonesia (2005), Japan (2004), Mexico (2004), Philippines (1999), Slovenia (2004), S. Korea (2000), Spain (2000),
Sweden (2003), Taiwan (1998), Thailand (2004), US (2003).
7Such data are not available for either Indonesia or the Philippines.
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Figure 3: Observation year is the year that each country in the sample is observed. The “best” and “worst” years
are identified using the old-age dependency ratio. Hence the “best” (“worst”) year is the year with the lowest (highest)
old-age dependency ratio. As can be seen, population ageing has a substantial impact on the demographic structure of
the voting cohorts. Details on the demographic structure of each country are provided in Figure 5, in the Appendix.
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the current population age structure compared to the “best” and “worst” years defined in terms of
old-age dependency. The old-age dependency ratio is the percentage of people over 65 in the working
age population (15-64). Hence the “best” (“worst”) year is the year with the lowest (highest) old-age
dependency ratio. Similarly, as we discuss below, an essential element in our empirical exercise is
the interest rate. We use data on the real interest rate, drawn from the World Bank database.8
2.2 Methodology
The empirical exercise that we conduct in this section is based on the political economy application
proposed by Rangel (2003). In his stylized model, individuals of different generations interact to
decide on the size of IGTs. Intergenerational altruism does not exist, so every decision is driven by
selfish preferences. Rangel argues that it is possible to have a sustained IGT system with positive
BITs and FITs even with “egoistic” generations. As discussed in the introduction, for this to happen,
three conditions must be satisfied: first, the agents should have at least two exchange problems that
require simultaneous cooperation; second, the intergenerational program must generate a positive
continuation value for working cohorts for them to back it; and third, the generation should be
engaged in a game of simple trigger strategies, where the fear of punishment creates a link between
FITs and BITs, i.e., an incentive for the middle aged to invest sufficiently in transfers to the old and
young to avoid the punishment for not cooperating.
By way of application, Rangel generates a political economy model where agents live for nine
periods a = 1, ..., 9 and where each period represents ten years. The individuals are dependent
8http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR. The real interest rate is defined as the lending interest rate
adjusted for inflation measured by the GDP deflator.
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children during the first two periods, working age adults in the following five and retirees in the last
two. Only workers receive an income; the rest receive transfers only. Agents can borrow and save at
the interest rate, r>0. In addition, every period, society decides the amount it wishes to devote to
the system of BITs (i.e. public pensions, health care, other in-cash or other in-kind transfers). The
system is financed solely by workers, who have to pay a lump-sum payroll tax T .9 Finally, there is
another lump-sum tax E that is used to finance the FITs (i.e. education, child health care, other
in-cash or other in-kind transfers), which is imposed on both workers and retirees.
In the following section, we explain in detail how the continuation value of the system of IGTs
is calculated to assess the political viability of such a system.
2.2.1 Continuation Value
The continuation surplus is the value generated from the transition from a state of autarky to one
in which IGTs take place. The continuation value of the BITs is measured as the present value of
all benefits received minus taxes paid.
In the case of the linked system of pensions and education (Section 3.1), all the benefits received
by the voting cohorts are those received during the retirement period (a ≥ 8); and, all the taxes
paid are those paid during the working age period (a = 3...7). The continuation value is computed
as shown by equations 1 and 2 following the stylized model of Rangel (2003).
In the case of total public transfers (Section 3.2), we consider taxes (benefits) paid (received)
by the voting age groups (a ≥ 3) in order to calculate the continuation value of total public IGTs.
In this case, we take into account the present values of all the benefits received less the taxes paid
during both working age and retirement as shown in equation 3.10
CVa =
9∑
i=8
PBi
(1 + r)i−a
−
7∑
i=a
PTi
(1 + r)i−a
(1)
where CVa is the continuation value for working age population (a ≥ 3), PT are the payroll taxes
paid by workers a ≥ 3 and PB are pension benefits received when retired a = 8, 9, and
CVa =
9∑
i=a
PBi
(1 + r)i−a
(2)
where CVa is the continuation value for the retirees a = 8, 9.
CVa =
9∑
i=a
TPBi − TTi
(1 + r)i−a
(3)
where TPB are total public benefits and TT are total taxes paid by cohorts (a ≥ 3) for public IGTs.
9This is the baseline version; in the case of the total public transfers below, we also take into account the non-
payroll taxes that the elderly pay and the benefits that the working-age agents receive in order to compute their
continuation value.
10This equation is authors’ elaboration on the basis of present value analysis.
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2.2.2 Voting
The continuation value measures the value of keeping the current system (i.e. public pensions or total
public transfers towards the adults) and, hence, the willingness to vote in favor of it. Furthermore,
according to Rangel’s model, only if the continuation value is positive for the majority of voters it
is possible to invest in education. In each period, voters choose between (0;T ) for the BITs and
between (0;E) for the FITs. All agents in cohorts above the second cast a vote. This means that if
we have a representative voter for each cohort (decade), there is a total of seven votes.11
First, what is needed for a viable BITs (i.e. PAYG pension) system is to hold a majority, that
is, to obtain at least four votes in favor of such a system. Bearing in mind that retirees always
vote in favor of the current system – because they receive positive net transfers – the decision to
retain the current system depends entirely on the middle-aged cohorts. More specifically, cohorts
a = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 are the final decision makers. That is, to sustain the system in a representative voting
scenario, at least two out of these five votes are needed to ensure a simple majority. This means
that as long as the continuation values of at least two out of five middle-aged cohorts are positive,
the majority votes for BITs. Note that the middle-aged cohorts vote for BITs not because they care
about current retirees, but because they believe, quite rightly, that otherwise they will not receive
any benefits when retired.
However, to sustain a system of bilateral intergenerational transfers (BITs and FITs) besides
choosing the amount deemed sufficient to invest in BITs, it is also needed to invest optimally in
FITs.12 Thus, if inequality 4 holds for, at least, four of the age cohorts a = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, the
majority is willing to vote for education, because the system – that links BITs and FITs – generates
a continuation value that is bigger than the FITs (i.e. education) tax that they have to pay.13
CVa ≥ EPa (4)
where Pa is the relative size of each age cohort. Therefore, in short, there could be a sustained path
of BITs and FITs – and hence a system of IGTs would be politically viable – if three conditions are
satisfied: First, if and only if the continuation value of choosing BITs is positive for the majority of
voters (1, 2 or 3); second, if and only if the continuation value of BITs is greater than the amount
invested in FITs (inequality 4); and, third, age cohorts play voting strategies that link BITs to FITs.
The next section shows the results, which we expect to be driven by the age shape of the public
transfers profile plus the demographic structure of each country. In addition, the usual discount
effect should also be noted, that is, where taxes paid and benefits received at earlier stages in the
life cycle are discounted to a lesser extent.
11 In more realistic case, as shown below, we weight the votes by the size of each cohort using the demographic
structure as a proxy for the electorate size of each cohort.
12This is a direct consequence of generations adopting simple trigger strategies. In fear of being punished and
receiving no benefits, current working cohorts are forced to transfer and invest optimal (sufficient) amounts in BITs
and FITs, respectively.
13Note that cohort 9 always votes against FITs because they are not alive during the next period. The amount
invested in FITs is paid proportionally in accordance with the size of each cohort.
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3 Results
3.1 Pensions and Education
In this section we conduct our exercise for a linked IGT system of pensions and education.14 These
transfers have been linked in the previous literature and are the main public policies devoted to the
two dependent sides of the economic life cycle (i.e. children and the elderly).15
First, we compute the continuation values for the pension systems in our sample of countries.
Second, by deducting tax E to finance education, we obtain the continuation value for the system of
linked pensions and education. Finally, we assess whether such a system is viable during a particular
year for each sample country, and also when using alternative demographic scenarios.
Thus, first, using equations 1, 2 and the real interest rate -for each country in a particular year- we
calculate the continuation value of each voting cohort. As can be seen from Table 1, the continuation
values for age groups a = 3, 4 are negative for the vast majority of the selected countries.16 The
results confirm the theoretical predictions made by Rangel (2003). The interpretation is quite
straightforward. Under dynamic efficiency, young workers aged 21 to 40 (age groups 3 and 4) are
unwilling to support the system of IGTs, because given the present values the taxes they pay are
higher than the benefits they receive. At the same time, it is clear that retirees fully support the
system, because they enjoy retirement benefits without having to pay any more taxes. With two
groups against and two in favor of the system, the final outcome of the voting procedure depends on
age groups a = 5, 6, 7. As is derived from the results, the CVs of groups six and seven are positive
for all countries except South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Therefore, as Table 2 shows, the rest of
the countries (i.e. 13 out of 16 countries – see column 2) obtain a majority with at least four votes in
favor of the pensions. To obtain this result, we weight all cohorts equally (adopting a representative
agent view) and ignoring the demographic structure of the population. In contrast, when we weight
the age groups – using the real demographic structure to compute number of votes – the voting
outcomes are considerably different. Only half the countries – most of which are developed – vote
in favor of pensions (column 3).
As equations 1 and 2 make apparent, the value of the interest rate plays a key role in the
calculation of the continuation value for workers and for retirees, respectively. So next, we examine
how the outcomes would be modified if all countries were to “play under the same rules”. Thus, we
seek to determine the changes generated when assuming the same interest rate for each country in
the sample. In this way, we control for the fact that the interest rate might be affecting our results.
As is evident from column 4 in Table 2 the results do not vary significantly from that of the baseline
scenario (column 3) for most of the countries in the sample except of Brazil.17
14Data for Indonesia and the Philippines are not available for this section.
15The size of public pensions and education in OECD countries in 2013 was on average 8.2% and 4.8% of GDP, re-
spectively. Data on public pensions and education are taken from https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/pension-spending.
htm and https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/public-spending-on-education.htm, respectively.
16This result is in line with Bohn (1999), who calculates the continuation value of PAYG social security in the US.
He shows that it is negative for the young voters, but strictly positive for voters above the median voter age.
17This outcome is due to the high real interest rate in Brazil for the particular year and hence higher discount for
the future retirement benefits.
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Table 1: Continuation values for public pensions
Country CV3 CV4 CV5 CV6 CV7 CV8 CV9
Austria -45.049 22.627 115.223 219.421 312.111 374.165 206.664
Brazil -20.797 -20.480 -10.319 12.260 40.298 80.584 44.210
Costa Rica -13.956 -6.155 5.360 19.203 33.398 44.577 20.414
Finland -73.976 -20.978 57.938 144.292 216.533 242.355 121.095
Germany -43.184 -7.935 60.574 147.478 232.267 288.043 143.717
Hungary -56.584 -27.156 22.544 76.746 116.893 124.785 64.183
India -2.909 -1.755 -137 1.698 3.852 6.098 3.238
Japan -47.645 -20.595 19.732 72.614 129.101 164.056 65.588
Mexico -20.890 -14.223 -4.591 6.011 13.144 17.234 7.940
Slovenia -67.928 -30.221 31.077 90.867 133.616 158.028 77.067
South Korea -30.272 -24.535 -15.987 -6.373 2.824 9.815 1.888
Spain -59.423 -26.995 28.131 92.044 142.951 167.603 81.416
Sweden -90.612 -17.526 87.126 205.319 328.886 411.976 202.918
Taiwan -37.026 -31.258 -21.991 -11.503 -2.850 2.139 1.127
Thailand -15.950 -13.912 -10.998 -7.115 -3.125 113 57
US -63.071 -37.726 15.610 81.181 148.336 195.378 101.788
Note: CVa is the continuation value and the subscript indicates the cohort. For
example, CV3 and CV9 are the continuation values for cohort 3 (21-30 year-olds)
and cohort 9 (81-90 year olds), respectively. The negative/positive values denote
the willingness/reluctance of a particular cohort to support pensions, respectively.
Continuation values are calculated converting currencies to US dollars (per capita)
based on purchasing power parity (PPP) ratios in a particular year for each country.
Table 2: Voting scenarios for pension and education transfers
Voting on Pensions Voting on Pensions & Education
Country VR VDS VSIR BY WY VR VDS VSIR BY WY
Austria 85,71 83,12 83,12 79,24 86,76 57,14 56,16 78,69 77,53 75,23
Brazil 57,14 25,83 100 21,59 58,49 42,86 24,26 98,42 20,99 45,66
Costa Rica 71,43 46,14 46,14 40,58 73,78 57,14 44,22 44,22 38,81 60,48
Finland 71,43 65,85 65,85 51,48 69,87 57,14 61,49 61,49 50,24 58,08
Germany 71,43 64,33 85,28 60,92 74,93 57,14 59,94 80,90 59,46 64,15
Hungary 71,43 61,74 61,74 54,30 70,71 57,14 58,02 58,02 52,94 60,63
India 57,14 24,26 24,26 21,85 55,37 42,86 23,40 23,40 21,13 46,62
Japan 71,43 65,47 65,47 46,22 75,38 57,14 60,46 60,46 45,38 61,40
Mexico 57,14 24,80 24,80 23,26 57,95 42,86 23,18 23,18 22,40 45,55
Slovenia 71,43 61,75 61,75 54,41 73,04 57,14 58,60 58,60 52,76 61,93
S. Korea 42,86 15,01 15,01 10,06 46,27 28,57 13,77 13,77 9,21 16,31
Spain 71,43 57,97 57,97 49,91 73,92 57,14 53,65 53,65 48,25 61,79
Sweden 71,43 64,74 64,74 56,99 70,01 57,14 58,55 58,55 54,82 58,30
Taiwan 28,57 6,53 6,53 - - 14,29 5,20 5,20 - -
Thailand 28,57 6,54 6,54 3,56 26,24 0 0 0 0 0
US 71,43 59,95 59,95 52,07 68,71 42,86 34,17 34,17 31,96 42,71
Note: VR: percentage of votes of a cohort-representative agent. VDS: vote percentage taking into
account the demographic structure of the voting cohorts. VSIR: vote percentage when part of the
imposed real demographic structure, CVs are gauged with same interest rate for all countries (4,2%).
BY: Best year, the year of the lowest old-age dependency ratio. WY: Worst year, the year with the
highest old-age dependency ratio. Country (best year, worst year): Austria (1950, 2060), Brazil
(1950, 2085), Costa Rica (1980, 2085), Finland (1950, 2100), Germany (1950, 2040), Hungary
(1950, 2059), India (1950, 2100), Japan (1950, 2051), Mexico (1955, 2095), Slovenia (1950, 2055),
South Korea (1950, 2064), Spain (1950, 2050), Sweden (1950, 2095), Taiwan (not available),
Thailand (1950, 2075), US (1950, 2100). The old dependency ratio in assessed in the period
between 1950 and 2100.
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Table 3: Political sustainability
Country VR VDS VSIR BY WY
Austria Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Brazil Not Not Sustained Not Not
Costa Rica Sustained Not Not Not Sustained
Finland Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Germany Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Hungary Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
India Not Not Not Not Not
Japan Sustained Sustained Sustained Not Sustained
Mexico Not Not Not Not Not
Slovenia Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
South Korea Not Not Not Not Not
Spain Sustained Sustained Sustained Not Sustained
Sweden Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Taiwan Not Not Not - -
Thailand Not Not Not Not Not
US Not Not Not Not Not
Note: VR: percentage of votes of a cohort-representative agent. VDS: vote
percentage taking into account the demographic structure of the voting cohorts.
VSIR: vote percentage when part of the imposed real demographic structure, CVs
are gauged with same interest rate for all countries (4.2%). BY: Best year, the
year of the lowest old-age dependency ratio. WY: Worst year, the year with the
highest old-age dependency ratio. Sustained: when a linked system of pensions
and education transfers would be voted for by the majority. Non-sustained:
when not supported by the majority.
In a second exercise, we consider two different demographic scenarios (Table 2, column 5 and 6).
Essentially, we test what would happen to the voting process if instead of using the demographic
structure of each country in the year selected for observation, we employ the demographic structure
of the “best” and “worst” years as defined above. As can be seen, we obtain better results in terms of
votes during the “worst” year than we do during either the “best” year or the observed year for each
country.18 This can be understood in terms of political economy, whereby population ageing makes
the median voter older, thus increasing his/her continuation value and making the system politically
more popular. This result is in line with the hypothesis of the “political power of the elderly”,
according to which population ageing makes the median voter older and, hence, more inclined to
support greater expenditure on pensions.19
The next step is to test whether a positive investment in education is maintained (Table 2,
columns 7 to 11) and whether a system of intergenerational transfer – where generations link the
education to pensions – is politically tenable (Table 3). To conduct this test, we check whether
inequality 4 holds for age cohorts a = 5, 6, 7, 8. If inequality 4 holds for these age groups, this means
that the majority of voters are willing to support investments in education, because the system –
that links education and pensions – generates a continuation value that is higher than the education
tax they have to pay. As illustrated in Table 2, inequality 4 holds for the simple majority of voters,
in only a few countries. More specifically, only half the countries can support forward IGTs such as
18In the Appendix Table 7 in the Appendix, we reproduce the voting scenarios using the ageing demographic
structure as projected in the future. Evidently the voting outcomes are better than in the observed year (Table 2).
19See the political economy literature on social security (pensions):[Browning (1975); Boadway and Wildasin (1989);
Breyer and Craig (1997); Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin (1999); Tabellini (2000); Persson and Tabellini (2000); Disney
(2007); Shelton (2008); Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009); Hollanders and Koster (2012);Michailidis et al. (2016)].
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Table 4: Continuation values for total public transfers of voting cohorts
Country CV3 CV4 CV5 CV6 CV7 CV8 CV9
Austria 116.759 200.851 324.282 462.498 512.525 394.904 224.439
Brazil -11.290 -6.318 18.047 58.877 78.975 73.906 43.133
Costa Rica 24.491 35.445 55.533 79.842 89.322 74.576 40.300
Finland 72.115 137.836 267.056 406.803 479.540 371.168 224.679
Germany 66.614 101.477 209.753 348.485 456.041 382.131 234.291
Hungary 28.951 59.340 140.305 237.132 283.061 204.029 104.942
India -1.778 -600 519 1.148 1.635 1.612 1.325
Indonesia -6.542 -5.040 -2.918 -701 701 847 425
Japan 30.560 63.883 131.474 226.446 317.498 267.527 155.417
Mexico 17.802 24.759 42.105 60.191 62.456 48.344 22.921
Philippines -9.944 -8.906 -6.676 -3.935 -856 128 -244
Slovenia 71.433 114.753 212.301 302.837 315.782 235.287 126.627
South Korea -6.245 2.851 23.459 44.863 53.484 37.116 15.704
Spain -47.451 -20.166 49.278 137.278 195.204 165.904 90.720
Sweden 153.341 226.425 355.452 522.530 687.532 611.277 387.882
Taiwan -9.096 -3.078 30.420 68.044 84.687 70.803 36.927
Thailand -19.106 -18.730 -14.879 -8.226 -2.224 393 1.140
US 34.878 49.256 141.447 262.920 381.279 345.935 219.527
Note: CVa is the continuation value and the subscript indicates the cohort. For ex-
ample, CV3 and CV9 are the continuation values for cohort 3 (21-30 year-olds) and
cohort 9 (81-90 year olds), respectively. The negative/positive values denote the will-
ingness/reluctance of a particular cohort to support pensions, respectively. Continu-
ation values are calculated converting currencies to US dollars (per capita) based on
purchasing power parity (PPP) ratios in a particular year for each country.
education (column 8).
However, a system of IGTs like the one linking education to pensions can only receive political
backing, if the majority support both pensions and education transfers. As such, the results of
voting on pensions have to be matched by the voting outcomes on education. As is apparent from
Table 3, a system of pensions and education would receive the support of the majority of voters in
very few countries. Indeed, if the decision was put to the vote, Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Japan, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden would vote in favor of a system of pensions and education in
most of the voting scenarios in our exercise.
3.2 Total Public Transfers
In the previous section, we assessed the political sustainability of the common system of pensions
and education. In this section, we conduct the same exercise considering instead the total public
IGTs for the elderly (BITs) and children (FITs), respectively. Total public transfers consist of public
education, public health, public pensions, public transfers, and other in-kind and in-cash transfers.
Each of the categories includes the inflows (benefits) and outflows (taxes) received and paid by
individuals during each year of their life.
In this case we employ equation 3 to compute the continuation value of the voting age cohorts.20
As shown in Table 4 when the whole NTA profile is taken into account to compute the continuation
20Note that when using equations 1 and 2, we omit taxes paid in dependent ages and benefit received in working
ages. This is a minor problem when dealing with retirement pensions and education, but it is of greater importance
when referring to all welfare state transfers.
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Table 5: Voting Scenarios, BITs and FITs
Voting on BITs Voting on BITs & FITs
Country VR VDS VSIR BY WY VR VDS VSIR BY WY
Austria 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 95,57 95,57 98,29 88,46
Brazil 71,43 44,06 100 39,52 72,93 57,14 42,49 98,42 38,91 60,10
Costa Rica 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 98,09 98,09 98,22 86,70
Finland 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 95,64 95,64 98,77 88,21
Germany 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 95,62 95,62 98,54 89,22
Hungary 100 100 58,02 52,94 60,63 85,71 96,28 58,02 52,94 60,63
India 71,43 43,52 43,52 40,72 71,09 57,14 42,66 42,66 40 62,34
Indonesia 42,86 12,86 12,86 10,98 40,06 28,57 12,06 12,06 10,22 14,49
Japan 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 94,99 78,22 68,52 86,02
Mexico 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 98,38 67,37 99,14 87,60
Philippines 14,29 2,87 2,87 2,79 13,03 14,29 2,87 2,87 2,79 0
Slovenia 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 96,85 96,85 98,35 88,88
South Korea 85,71 74,90 74,90 67,95 87,61 57,14 47,64 47,64 41,64 60,10
Spain 71,43 57,97 57,97 49,91 73,92 57,14 53,65 53,65 48,25 61,79
Sweden 100 100 100 100 100 85,71 93,81 93,81 97,82 88,30
Taiwan 71,43 47,94 47,94 - - 57,14 46,61 46,61 - -
Thailand 28,57 6,54 6,54 3,56 26,24 0 0 0 0 0
US 100 100 100 100 100 71,43 76,36 55,68 73,37 89,41
Note: VR: percentage of votes of a cohort-representative agent. VDS: vote percentage taking into
account the demographic structure of the voting cohorts. VSIR: vote percentage when part of the
imposed real demographic structure, CVs are gauged with same interest rate for all countries (4,2%).
BY: Best year, the year of the lowest old-age dependency ratio. WY: Worst year, the year with
the highest old-age dependency ratio. Country (best year, worst year: Austria (1950, 2060), Brazil
(1950, 2085), Costa Rica (1980, 2085), Finland (1950, 2100), Germany (1950, 2040), Hungary
(1950, 2059), India (1950, 2100), Indonesia (1965, 2095), Japan (1950, 2051), Mexico (1955,
2095), Philippines (1995, 2100), Slovenia (1950, 2055), South Korea (1950, 2064), Spain (1950,
2050), Sweden (1950, 2095), Taiwan (not available), Thailand (1950, 2075), US (1950, 2100). The
old dependency ratio is assessed in the period between 1950 and 2100. .
value, the results are strikingly different from the corresponding outcomes in Table 1. In contrast
with the previous section, more than half the countries have positive continuation values even for the
youngest voting cohorts (CV3 and CV4). This indicates that the net present value (benefits received
minus taxes payed) of the welfare system is positive for voting cohorts. Therefore, they have strong
incentives to support such a system of IGTs.
Nevertheless, there are some countries, including India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand, where the voting cohorts present negative current values of the system of
welfare transfers.21 These differences between countries can be explained by the differences in the
structure of their NTA profiles. In other words, countries have different patterns for the reallocation
of resources and, therefore, different patterns of IGTs. As is evident from Figure 4 (Appendix), the
aforementioned countries with negative continuation values present similar patterns of IGTs. For
most Asian countries, the overall size of public transfers is small and remains quite concentrated
among young dependents. As such, the age groups reallocate their resources primarily via family
transfers as opposed to via publicly funded systems of BITs and FITs. This might constitute the
main reason why the continuation values of total public transfers are negative for most of the voting
cohorts in these countries. In contrast, in European countries, public transfers are greater and seem
21Just as before in the case of Brazil, the negative continuation values are mainly driven by the unusually high real
interest rate.
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Table 6: Political Sustainability of Total Public Transfers
Country VR VDS VSIR BY WY
Austria Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Brazil Sustained Not Sustained Not Sustained
Costa Rica Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Finland Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Germany Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Hungary Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
India Sustained Not Not Not Sustained
Indonesia Not Not Not Not Not
Japan Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Mexico Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Philippines Not Not Not Not Not
Slovenia Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
South Korea Sustained Not Not Not Sustained
Spain Sustained Sustained Sustained Not Sustained
Sweden Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Taiwan Sustained Not Not - -
Thailand Not Not Not Not Not
US Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained Sustained
Note: VR: percentage of votes of a cohort-representative agent. VDS: vote
percentage taking into account the demographic structure of the voting cohorts.
VSIR: vote percentage when part of the imposed real demographic structure, CVs
are gauged with same interest rate for all countries (4.2%). BY: Best year, the
year of the lowest old-age dependency ratio. WY: Worst year, the year with the
highest old-age dependency ratio. Sustained: when a linked system of pensions
and education transfers would be voted for by the majority. Non-sustained:
when not supported by the majority. .
to have crowded out private transfers. Similarly, they are quite clustered around the old, which
explains the greater support given by voters, despite the discounting effects.
The voting outcomes for the total welfare transfers are shown in Table 5 and 6. Evidently, most
of the countries in our sample would have voted in favor of a system of total public IGTs. More
specifically, as shown in Table 6, when we consider a representative voter, 15 out of 18 countries
would have backed total public transfers (column 2). The number of countries falls to 11 when we
take into account the observed population structure and we weight the votes by the size of each
cohort (column 3). Controlling for the interest rate does not change the outcomes very much, with
the exception of Brazil, where allowing for the same interest rate changes the outcome in favor of
public transfers (column 4). Finally, as in the previous section, when considering the demographic
transition the outcomes vary considerably, between the “best” year (column 5), the observed year
(column 3) and the “worst” year (column 6). Clearly, population ageing increases the political
support for total public transfers directed towards the young (FITs) and old (BITs).22
At this juncture, we should stress that differences in outcomes between the previous and the
current sections are due primarily to the differences in the data used. In this section, we take into
account all the public transfers that are made in each country. This means, the continuation value
of each cohort is measured including the present value of all benefits received and all taxes paid.
In contrast, the continuation value of pensions and education takes into account only those pension
22In Table 8 in the Appendix we reproduce the voting scenarios using the ageing demographic structure as projected
into the future. Evidently, the outcomes of the voting scenarios are better during the “worst year” than during the
observed year (Table 5).
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benefits received when retired and those social contributions paid when working. Hence, many of the
benefits that young and middle-aged workers (a = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) receive are included in the calculation
of the continuation value in this section but not in the previous one. These benefits might include,
for example, health care or other in-kind or in-cash transfers that these voting cohorts receive from
the welfare state. Thus, in present values middle-aged workers benefit more from a system of total
public transfers than they do from a linked system of pensions and education. Thus, by including a
broader spectrum of transfers it is plausible to assume that more votes can be attracted from young
and middle-aged workers (a = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
4 Conclusions
The empirical exercise conducted in this paper follows the political economy application made by
Rangel (2003) using National Transfer Accounts data. The main goal has been to evaluate the polit-
ical sustainability of an intergenerational system organized through the linkages between backward
and forward public transfers. We have assessed the political viability of this system by computing
the continuation value for these backward and forward transfers. We employed two types of data:
first, we used pensions and education as backward and forward transfers, respectively; and, second,
we employed the total public transfers directed towards the old and the young. We, then, assessed
the political sustainability of the system by computing the continuation value – i.e. if the majority
of voters receive more than they pay in present values in the observed years – of the system of in-
tergenerational transfers. In those instances that the continuation values for the majority of voters
is positive, we assume that they would have supported such a system if the decision had been put
to the vote in that particular year for each country.
Our findings suggest that only in about half the countries studied – primarily developed countries
– the majority would vote for a system of intergenerational transfers, including only pensions and
education. In contrast, when we conducted the same exercise using the total public intergenerational
transfers, our results proved to be significantly better. The difference between the respective out-
comes could be attributed to differences in the data employed. More specifically, the differences can
be associated with the inclusion of a broader spectrum of public transfers (i.e. health care, other in-
kind and other in-cash transfers) other than pensions and education. In this way, the young and the
middle-aged take into account not only the present values of retirement benefits but also the present
values of the benefits that they receive from the aforementioned public transfers. Hence, in the case
of total public transfers, it is more plausible to attract votes from the young and middle-aged.
We also identify a cluster of Asian countries for which continuation values are negative for most
of the voting cohorts and, as such, the voting outcomes indicate a non-sustained system for both
pensions and education and for total backward and forward public transfers. We associate these
results with the stage of development of intergenerational transfers and, especially, with the fact that
public transfers continue to be dominated by private transfers. Hence, there are still few political
incentives for voting in favor of public transfers.
In addition, when we conduct our exercise employing the “best” and the “worst” demographic
scenarios in terms of the old-age dependency ratio, it is found that population ageing has a positive
effect on the political viability of both systems of intergenerational transfers considered here. In
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other words, in terms of political economy, ageing makes the median voter older and increases
his/her continuation value, thus, boosting the political sustainability of the system. This result is
in line with the hypothesis of the “political power of the elderly”, according to which population
ageing makes the median voter older and, hence, more inclined to support higher expenditure on
public transfers towards the elderly. However, this raises the question as to how increasing political
viability might interact with decreasing financial feasibility.
Thus, although ageing pressure on the financial health of the PAYG pensions system points
to a conflict between financial and political sustainability, our results indicate some positive signs.
More specifically, population ageing can be translated into a higher continuation value for the median
voter that can be invested in education making the joint system of pensions and education politically
more viable (Rangel, 2003). Thus, pensions can foster education. This, in turn, improves the future
financial prospects of the PAYG system. Higher investment in education can boost the productivity
of future workers and consequently the level of their contributions to social security and revenues
from taxing their income. The immediate policy conclusion is that pensions could be pre-funded
by increasing education expenditure. Moreover, we can suggest that it might be a useful reform
to require legislation to vote on pensions and education as a unique social policy package. This
reasoning could also be applied to a broader spectrum of intergenerational transfers directed toward
children or the elderly, which also tend to be financed implicitly on a PAYG basis.
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Appendix
Table 7: Voting Scenarios on Pensions and Education of the “Worst” Year
Voting on Pensions Voting on Pensions & Education Pensions & Education
Country WY VR WY VDS WY VSIR WY VR WY VDS WY VSIR WY VR WY VDS WY VSIR
Austria 85,71 86,76 86,76 71,43 75,23 75,23 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Brazil 57,14 58,49 100 42,86 45,66 87,17 Not Not Sustained
Costa Rica 71,43 73,78 73,78 57,14 60,48 60,48 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Finland 71,43 69,87 69,87 57,14 58,08 58,08 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Germany 71,43 74,93 87,55 57,14 64,15 76,78 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Hungary 71,43 70,71 70,71 57,14 60,63 60,63 Sustained Sustained Sustained
India 57,14 55,37 55,37 42,86 46,62 46,62 Not Not Not
Japan 71,43 75,38 75,38 57,14 61,40 61,40 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Mexico 57,14 57,95 57,95 42,86 45,55 45,55 Not Not Not
Slovenia 71,43 73,04 73,04 57,14 61,93 61,93 Sustained Sustained Sustained
South Korea 42,86 46,27 46,27 14,29 16,31 16,31 Not Not Not
Spain 71,43 73,92 73,92 57,14 61,79 61,79 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Sweden 71,43 70,01 70,01 57,14 58,30 58,30 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Thailand 28,57 26,24 26,24 0 0 0 Not Not Not
US 71,43 68,71 68,71 42,86 42,71 42,71 Not Not Not
Note: WY: Worst Year. Every voting scenario is calculated using the demographic structure of the “worst year”. WY VR: vote
percentage when each cohort has a representative voter. WY VDS: vote percentage when the demographic structure is taken into
account. WY VSIR: vote percentage when CVs are computed with same interest rate for all countries (4,20%). “Worst” year, the
year with the highest old dependency ratio. Country ( “worst” year): Austria (2060), Brazil (2085), Costa Rica (2085), Finland
(2100), Germany (2040), Hungary (2059), India (2100), Japan (2051), Mexico (2095), Slovenia (2055), South Korea (2064),
Spain (2050), Sweden (2095), Taiwan (not available), Thailand (2075), US (2100).
Table 8: Voting Scenarios on Total BITs and FITs of the “Worst” Year
Voting on BITs Voting on BITs & FITs BITs & FITs
Country WY VR WY VDS WY VSIR WY VR WY VDS WY VSIR WY VR WY VDS WY VSIR
Austria 100 100 100 85,71 88,46 88,46 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Brazil 71,43 72,93 100 57,14 60,10 87,17 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Costa Rica 100 100 100 85,71 86,70 86,70 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Finland 100 100 100 85,71 88,21 88,21 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Germany 100 100 100 85,71 89,22 89,22 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Hungary 100 100 100 85,71 89,93 89,93 Sustained Sustained Sustained
India 71,43 71,09 71,09 57,14 62,34 62,34 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Indonesia 42,86 40,06 40,06 14,29 14,49 14,49 Not Not Not
Japan 100 100 100 85,71 86,02 86,02 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Mexico 100 100 100 85,71 87,60 87,60 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Philippines 14,29 13,03 13,03 0 0 0 Not Not Not
Slovenia 100 100 100 85,71 88,88 88,88 Sustained Sustained Sustained
South Korea 85,71 87,61 87,61 57,14 60,10 73,68 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Spain 71,43 73,92 73,92 57,14 61,79 61,79 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Sweden 100 100 100 85,71 88,30 88,30 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Thailand 28,57 26,24 26,24 0 0 0 Not Not Not
US 100 100 100 85,71 89,41 58,12 Sustained Sustained Sustained
Note: WY: Worst Year. Every voting scenario is calculated using the demographic structure of the “worst year”.WY VR:
vote when each cohort has a representative voter. WY VDS: vote percentage when the demographic structure is taken into
account. WY VSIR: vote percentage when CVs are computed with same interest rate for all countries (4,02%). Country
( “worst” year): Austria (2060), Brazil (2085), Costa Rica (2085), Finland (2100), Germany (2040), Hungary (2059),
India (2100), Indonesia (2095), Japan (2051), Mexico (2095), Philippines (2100), Slovenia (2055), South Korea (2064),
Spain (2050), Sweden (2095), Taiwan (not available), Thailand (2075), US (2100).
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Figure 4: Intergenerational Transfers Structure and Life Cycle Deficit
LCD: Life cycle deficit. TG: Public transfers. TF: Private transfers. LCD, TG and TF values are calculated converting
currencies to US dollars (per capita) based on purchasing power parity (PPP) ratios in a particular year for each country.
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Figure 5: Demographic Transition, Population Ageing per Country
Observation year is the year that each country is observed in the sample. The “best” and “worst” year are identified
using the old dependency ratio (not availiable for Taiwan). Hence the “best” (“worst”) year is the year with the lowest
(highest) old dependency ratio. As we can see population ageing has a substantial impact on the demographic structure
of the voting cohorts.
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Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
Slovenia
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
South Korea
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
Spain
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
Sweden
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
Taiwan
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year
Thailand
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
US
21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90
0
0.1
0.2
Age Group
%
of
P
op
u
la
ti
on
Observed Year Year Best Year Worst Year
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